Extraordinary amounts of public funds and/or assistance were made available to banks since the onset of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Governments worldwide have launched a massive bailout package to support banks in distress. Using a probit model, this paper investigates the likelihood of bailouts following the financial crisis. Our results lead us to conclude that the governance characteristics of banks, specifically the characteristics of boards, bank risks, as well as bank-level and country-specific banking sector features, explain the likelihood of bailouts in the European banking sector. In particular we find that board banking experience, longer directors' tenure, less busy boards and the existence of a corporate governance committee decrease the likelihood of banks participating in a bailout programme. Inversely, board independence, credit and liquidity risks increase the probability of banks being bailed out. Furthermore, fewer limitations on banking freedom and greater openness of the banking sector have a harmful impact on the occurrence of bailouts. Our study therefore suggests relevant policy implications, which might help supervisors, regulators and other public authorities in avoiding costly bailouts.
Introduction
The global financial crisis, starting in 2007, generated numerous public interventions into banking systems. Given that the failure of many banks was imminent, governments all over the world enacted a variety of rescue plans to prevent wide scale financial collapse. Among the many means of government intervention were: (1) direct equity injections, providing liquidity support to banks, (2) government guaranteed debt issuance programmes and the issuance of guarantees to reassure depositors and (3) purchases of distressed assets by the government or, more generally, the provision of mechanisms to relieve financial institutions from impaired or "toxic" assets (Breitenfellner and Wagner, 2010; Grossman and Woll, 2014) . Most of the government bailout programmes were a mix of distinct means of government interventions. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the United States (US) was a mix of equity injections and distressed asset purchases, while most of the European bailout programmes combined government guaranteed debt issuance programmes with direct equity injections (Breitenfellner and Wagner, 2010) . More specifically, in the European Union (EU) most member states provided general guarantees for the whole banking system as well as support for the weakest banks, through guarantees on bank liabilities, capital injections, impaired asset relief and funding support. State aid to the banking system in each member state had to be notified to -and approved by -the European Commission's Directorate General for Competition, which aims to ensure that the measures do not distort competition. Since October 2008 hundreds of decisions authorising State aid measures were taken. The bulk of this aid represented guarantees on liabilities, with recapitalisations being the second most used support instrument.
1 Support measures have commonly been accompanied by restrictions on dividend payments and on executive compensation, requirements for regular reporting on banking activity developments, government participation in the management of banks and restructuring requirements.
Based on much of the policy literature on banking crisis, we would expect a larger amount of bailouts whenever the banking sector has a relevant position in the economy.
In particular, as the size of the banking sector become larger, the need for government intervention will become more intense (Laeven and Valencia, 2010) . Thus, the significance of the banking system for the financing of the economy (e.g., the dependence of firms on funding provided by banks) is likely to play a role, urging governments to intervene. Accordingly, variation in policy responses might be a function of economic issues, where the government has little choice but to intervene once the crisis has erupted.
Moreover, a concentrated banking sector will have more lobbying resources and is more likely to have access to the government than a very dispersed one (Grossman and Woll, 2014) .
Also, in countries "bank-financed", where capital access depends on the bank credit, bankers and entrepreneurs tend to have personal relationships, with tight connections with the the government. Therefore, one might expect that close connections between the banking sector and the government (or, in other words, between bankers and members of the government) would impact on the occurrence of bailouts. The closer their relations the more likely are bailouts.
Additionally, if politicians do have some discretion when designing bailout plans, we should see variation across countries according to political factors (Grossman and Woll, 2014) . The political ideology of government might make a difference. Traditionally, conservative parties are assumed to have closer relationships with the banking sector and financial interests, while left governments should be concerned about the redistributive effects of bank rescues (Cioffi and Höpner, 2006) . Also, countries with a liberal market tradition should refrain from extensive government aid, while more interventionist countries should be more proactive (Grossman and Woll, 2014) .
When banks have very serious financial problems, solving them will imply, very often, the need for bailouts, which are extremely costly. The enormous magnitude of the global financial crisis, illustrated by the unparalleled volume of government support packages for the financial system, has highlighted the need for a clear identification of the determinants of bailouts in the banking sector. However, the literature lacks a deep and detailed analysis of the factors that determine bailouts in the context of the financial crisis.
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. Unlike previous studies that focus on the likelihood of financial distress or bankruptcy, which raises the question of defining the requirements, not always consensual, for a firm to be considered in financial distress 2 or in bankruptcy, in this study, we focus on bailouts, that can be considered a specific status in the firm's life, in the crisis context. So, our sample consists of banks which received government assistance, due to their critical financial distress status, in order to avoid the stage of bankruptcy. Substantial financial distress effects are incurred well prior to default (Elloumi and Gueyié, 2001) and to bailouts. Fich and Slezak (2008) identify the various aspects of a firm's governance structure that affect the probability and the predictability of bankruptcy once the firm has entered the state of financial distress. Overall, their findings indicate that governance characteristics are associated with the likelihood that financially distressed firms become bankrupt. Also, some other studies have found a significant relationship between a set of corporate governance attributes and the financial distress of firms, such as Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) for Canadian firms, Tsun-Siou and Yin-Hua (2004) for Taiwanese firms, Abdullah (2006) for Malaysian firms and Miglani et al. (2015) for Australian firms. However, the literature that analyses the determinants of the probability of bailouts of banks in the financial crisis, including governance mechanisms, either in a cross-country or in a single country context, is to the best of our knowledge almost non-existent. 3 Bailed-out banks are, by definition, in some sort of distress and exhibit high risk (Dam and Koetter, 2012) .
Being the "ultimate centre of control" of a firm (Mizruchi, 1983) , the board is responsible for its health and survival and thus, for the potential need of a bailout.
Corporate boards of directors are responsible for different tasks and responsibilities.
"Among these, and possibly the most critical is the obligation to maintain the firm's solvency" (Platt and Platt, 2012, p. 1139) . Previous studies have acknowledged that the board's functions of monitoring, advising and providing resources are essential to any firm's survival but they do not devote attention to how board configuration influences the probability of bailouts of banks in the financial crisis. So, our first research question is whether bank board characteristics prior to the financial crisis affect the likelihood of bank bailouts following the crisis.
The financial crisis has also raised questions related to risk measurement, risk growth and risk management within financial organisations in general and banks in particular. So, our second research question is whether the specific risks levels of banks -such as credit risk, liquidity risk and growth risk -before the crisis influence the probability of receiving bailouts following the crisis. If this relationship exists then a proper and regular assessment/analysis of risk can mitigate or even avoid bank bailouts.
Finally, our third research question is whether the pre-crisis size of banks, in order to analyse the well-known "too-big-to-fail" issue, and the pre-crisis bank capital are related to the likelihood of banks being bailed out following the crisis.
We examine the effect of the board of banks, specific risks levels of banks, size and capital of banks capital immediately prior to the financial crisis (2006) on the likelihood of bailouts following the crisis (2007 to 2009). Additionally, we include a set of control variables: bank-level and country-level control variables. We measure the variables before the crisis for two main reasons. First, since the effects of the crisis are overwhelming it is crucial to know if, and how, boards, specific risks levels, size and capital determine the probability of bank rescue from financial distress, in order to avoid bankruptcy, thereby influencing banking stability. For example, it is very useful to be aware whether a bank that has more experienced boards when entering the crisis will benefit from this greater experience following the crisis. Thus, we attempt to identify, at a bank level, early warning indicators of bank bailouts. Second, this approach mitigates endogeneity concerns because we use lagged independent variables to explain the probability of bailout, which makes it less likely that these variables are jointly determined.
Our study contributes to the ongoing debate regarding appropriate regulatory reform in the banking system by shedding light on the extent to which bank-specific corporate governance characteristics and in particular the features of the board of banks, which is one of the main governance mechanisms, specific risks levels of banks, bank size and bank capital have an impact on the likelihood of bailouts and, consequently, on the stability/fragility of the banking system. The severity of the financial crisis has produced strong pressure in favour of reforming financial regulation. So, by analysing the determinants of the likelihood of banks receiving State aid, our study helps public authorities in the process of introducting new recommendations, rules and practices, namely in their corporate governance codes, in order to prevent or mitigate a collapse in the future and, thus, promote stability. In short, our findings provide useful insights into the determinants of the banking sector health in Europe and, thereby, they are helpful in assisting banking supervisors and regulators in their task of guaranteeing a stable system.
Our paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature in four ways. First, unlike previous studies that analyse firms' probability of financial distress or bankruptcy in individual countries or groups of countries outside of Europe, we focus on the likelihood of bailout occurrence for banks in 17 European countries. We are not interested in financial distress per se nor in bankruptcy, but rather in financial distress that due to bailouts do not reach the stage of bankruptcy. So, we focus on a specific and different dimension of financial distress. Second, our paper adds to the literature that examines the influence of the features of the board on bank life as it provides a detailed analysis of the impact the characteristics of the board on bailouts. Therefore, it may be useful in the process of (re)configuring boards and may assist directors in taking steps that will decrease the likelihood of State aid. Third, we also include in our study the examination of the role of the specific risks of banks in predicting bailouts, using accounting and market measures. So, risk indicators are explicitly incorporated in our model.
Many banks had to be bailed out by their governments. It is believed that an analysis of the factors that led to the problems suffered by banks in Europe will be of enormous benefit. First, the findings can help banking authorities in their duty of ensuring a stable financial system. Second, the early detection of potential problems is likely to help reduce the expected cost of State aid and to decrease the likelihood of the problem spreading more widely through the financial system due to banking interconnectedness. Thus, we intend to provide an identification of the factors that make banks more prone to being bailed out by their governments, helping to predict bank bailouts and permitting the development of the necessary steps to avoid them.
We note that we investigate the determinants of the likelihood of bailouts of European banks following the financial crisis in order to answer the question "What is behind the bailouts of European banks?" We do not examine the amount of the bailout received by banks (e.g. the impact of the characteristics of the board on the amount of government assistance provided to banks) for two reasons. The first is that for some banks it is not possible to know exactly the amount of aid received but only the maximum amount of aid made available by the government, 4 thereby introducing potential errors in our analysis. The second is that for some other banks there is no available information on the amount of the bailout, either available or used. Thus, we would lose an important number of observations (banks), significantly reducing the sample size.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 present the literature review and the hypotheses development, Section 3 describes the data and methodology, Section 4 provides the empirical results and Section 5 provides the conclusion.
Literature review and hypotheses development
The literature which focuses on bailouts in the context of the crisis is practically inexistent, therefore we refer several times to the available literature relating to financial distress and bankruptcy as a basis for the formulation of our hypotheses.
Board independence and bailouts
Board composition critically influences the success of a firm (Hsu and Wu, 2014) . Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) argue that corporate failure may occur when the composition of a board is imbalanced or inadequate. So, incorrect representation of independent directors may affect a firm's ability to survive. For Daily and Dalton (1994b) although neither the number of independent directors nor the proportion of such directors are associated with bankruptcy, the effect of the interaction between the percentage of independent directors and the joint Chief Executive Officer (CEO)/Chairman roles is strongly related to bankruptcy. Identically, for Lajili and Zéghal (2010) the proportion of independent directors is positively but not significantly associated with the likelihood of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the three-way interaction term between independence, cumulative blockholding and duality structure show a positive and significant relationship. Furthermore, Daily and Dalton (1994a) show evidence that bankrupt firms have a higher proportion of affiliated directors. The structure-composition interaction term (the interaction between CEO/Chairman structure and the proportion of affiliated directors) is significant as well. Additionally, Platt and Platt (2012) comparing non-bankrupt firms with bankrupt firms conclude that non-bankrupt firms have a higher percentage of independent directors. However, more recently, Hsu and Wu (2014) examining the effect of board composition on the likelihood of corporate failure in the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2010, demonstrate that the likelihood of corporate failure is positively related to the proportion of independent directors on boards.
Concerning financial distress, Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) find that the proportion of outside directors is negatively associated with financial distress status. So, boards of financially distressed firms have significantly fewer outside members. On the contrary, Abdullah (2006), Brédart (2014a) , Brédart (2014b) and Miglani et al. (2015) show that the impact of board independence on the occurrence of financial distress is not significant. concludes that banks receiving bailout money had boards that were more independent.
According to Adams (2012) , this suggests that board independence may not necessarily be beneficial for banks. Independent directors may not always have the required expertise to oversee complex banking firms. Regarding the advisory role of boards, the lack of firm-specific knowledge on the part of independent directors may compromise their effectiveness and, so, explaining the positive relationship between the incidence of bailouts and board independence. The above arguments lead us to the first hypothesis (H1): H1: Board independence increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme following the financial crisis.
Board size and bailouts
Board size has a number of implications for the functioning of the board (Chaganti et al., 1985) .
Larger boards are less likely to become involved in strategic decision-making process (Judge Jr and Zeithaml, 1992) and may not be able to act effectively as a controlling body as they may have difficulties in coordinating their efforts, which leaves management relatively free to pursue their own goals (Chaganti et al., 1985) . From this point of view, a small number of board members produces a more effective control mechanism (Jensen, 1993) . Large boards also may have difficulty building the interpersonal relationships that further cohesiveness or maintaining high board effort norms (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) due to the potential "social loafing" that exists in large groups (Latané et al., 1979) . In addition, a smaller board may benefit from its ability to make decisions more quickly and avoid time-consuming debates.
However, a smaller board may more easily be influenced by the CEO and, also, a larger board tends to offer a wider range of experience, skills and different views and permit the inclusion of multiple perspectives on corporate strategy and operations (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Simpson and Gleason, 1999; Platt and Platt, 2012) . Some studies support these arguments (Chaganti et al., 1985; Platt and Platt, 2012; Brédart, 2014b) . Chaganti et al. (1985) find that non-failed retailing firms tend to have bigger boards than failed ones and Platt and Platt (2012) indicate that a smaller board is positively associated with bankrupt firms. Also, Brédart (2014b) shows a negative association between board size and financial distress. Additionally, for Brédart (2014a) the hypothesis which suggests that the board size has a negative impact on financial distress probability is partially supported by his model.
In contrast, other studies contradict this evidence. For Simpson and Gleason (1999) the number of directors on the board does not appear to impact future financial distress and Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) report that there is no significant difference between the board size of the financially distressed and healthy firms. Additionally, Lajili and Zéghal (2010) and Darrat et al. (2014) report that board size is not significantly associated with the likelihood of bankruptcy.
Some other studies support the advantages of smaller boards (Fich and Slezak, 2008; Adams, 2012; Salloum and Azoury, 2012) . Fich and Slezak (2008) contend that distressed firms with smaller boards are more likely to avoid bankruptcy, meaning that board size is significantly positively related to the probability of bankruptcy. Also, according to Salloum and Azoury (2012) 
CEO duality and bailouts
CEO duality has come under renewed scrutiny because of the perceived loss of board vigilance and resultant abuse of power. Carty and Weiss (2012) investigate whether CEO duality is associated with the receipt of bailout funds by publicly traded banks in the US and they do not find evidence that banks with a dual CEO corporate governance structure are more likely to participate in the Federal Government's bailout programmes.
Consistent with this view, other studies do not find a significant association between duality and the probability of financial distress (Elloumi and Gueyié, 2001; Abdullah, 2006; Miglani et al., 2015) .
However, Daily and Dalton (1994b) have evidenced that bankrupt firms are not more likely to be associated with the joint CEO/board structures but firms that are simultaneously characterized by joint CEO/Chairman structures and lower proportions of independent directors are associated with bankruptcy. Additionally, Lajili and Zéghal (2010) note that the duality structure is not a significant governance variable that affects the likelihood of bankruptcy, but when combined with board independence and cumulative blockholding the impact is positively significant.
It has been repeatedly emphasised that boards are more effective when one person does not simultaneously occupy the positions of CEO and Chairman. Lorsch and MacIver (1989, p. 185) Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) supports this idea as they report that dominant CEOs are more likely to be associated with firm bankruptcy. Also, other studies report that this duality is more prevalent in bankrupt firms (e.g., Daily and Dalton, 1994a; Darrat et al., 2014) . Based on the previous arguments, although not specific and directly related to bailouts, we predict the third hypothesis (H3) as follows: H3: Dual CEO corporate governance structure increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme following the financial crisis.
Board experience and bailouts
Operations of some firms are more technically demanding, thereby requiring specialist knowledge (Darrat et al., 2014) as is the case of banks. Industry expertise equips directors with a deeper understanding of the more complex financial instruments and transactions, industry dynamics and regulatory environment. Additionally, boards with financial experience have a better comprehension of the more opaque assets and complex activities, but financially experienced boards must also be given the right incentives to dissuade them from taking excessive risks (Becht et al., 2011) . On the one hand, boards with significant financial expertise should moderate risk exposure at their financial institutions and consequently mitigate or even prevent losses. A more financially knowledgeable board can recognise risks that will not pay off or that are unsound for the financial stability of the bank and can advise managers on avoiding such risks. On the other hand, financial experts on the board might recognise the government guarantee offered to banks and, consequently, be encouraged to pursue more risk-taking activities.
Concerning the financial crisis we expect that financial/banking experience plays a key role. An analysis of Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch prior to their collapse shows that their boards of directors lacked sufficient financial expertise (Fernandes and Fich, 2013) . Hau and Thum (2009) find evidence that the lack of financial experience of board members in German banks was strongly positively related to losses by the banks. In a sample of banks bailed out under the TARP, Fernandes and Fich (2013) show that the probability of a bailout decreases as experience increases. Overall, the results indicate that banks with banking experts on their boards are less likely to be bailed out. So, the banking experience of boards is expected to equally be of great relevance concerning the probability of bailouts of banks in Europe, providing them monitoring and advisory advantages. The fourth hypothesis (H4) is then stated as follows: H4: Supervisory directors' banking experience decreases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme following the financial crisis.
Director tenure and bailouts
The question of dealing with the length of service period or tenure should directly impact the way firms are governed (Lajili and Zéghal, 2010) . Boards with low tenure lack internal knowledge of the firm and industry specific issues and thus, are not as effective in decision making as boards with longer tenure (Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011) . On the other hand, extended tenure may magnify agency problems between insiders and outsiders (McNulty et al., 2013) . However, Vance (1983) contends that forcing directors to retire leads to a waste of talent and experience. By being allowed to serve more time on the board, supervisory directors could gain more intrinsic and precious knowledge about the firm's business environment, products and markets, as well as its financial position and growth strategies (Lajili and Zéghal, 2010) . This firm-specific knowledge obtained over time helps reduce information asymmetry between the board and management (Kim et al., 2014) .
In the context of the subprime lending, Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) find that the board configuration of the financial institutions that engaged in subprime lending were significantly different from those that did not. Specifically, subprime lenders had less board tenure.
Considering the special nature of banks, by extending the tenure on the boards, supervisory directors are in a better position to effectively monitor, detect and control opportunistic managerial behaviour in a timely manner, as well as to provide valuable and appropriate advice, thus potentially avoiding bailouts of banks. Supervisory directors with relatively short tenure on the board would be unable to detect signs of the severity of the problems, as in the pre-crisis period, and respond in a timely manner to problems arising from the activities of the bank on whose board they serve, making it more likely to be bailed out. Therefore, we formulate the fifth hypothesis (H5) as follows: H5: The longer the supervisory directors have served on the board, the less the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme following the financial crisis.
Board busyness and bailouts
More recent theoretical and empirical research highlights the importance of busy directors for the board process. Nevertheless, there is compelling theory and evidence to support competing positions on the governance impact of busy directors.
The first perspective, referred to as the Reputational Hypothesis, reflects the view that busy directors are preferred due to their superior ability as they are familiar with different managerial styles and business strategies and also bring a useful network and business contacts.
The second view of the role of busy directors, called Busyness Hypothesis, asserts that serving on multiple boards overcommits a director, which results in the director becoming too busy to adequately monitor management or, otherwise, shirking their governance responsibilities. The point behind the problem of busy directors is that, the busier a director is, the less effort he/she devotes to each of his/her tasks. So, multiple board appointments can adversely affect a board's decision-making effectiveness.
However, according to the Reputational Hypothesis the directors who are considered "busy" or "extremely busy" are chosen to be on so many boards precisely because of their high ability, which serves to offset the effect of their insufficient time. Muller-Kahle and
Lewellyn (2011) provide evidence that effort levels by board members decrease when directors serve on several boards. Thus, busy directors will not be able to devote sufficient effort to any one board, which provides support for the Busyness Hypothesis. Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) show that the likelihood of financial distress increases as outside directors hold more directorships. This result is consistent with the view that additional directorships held by outside directors distract these directors from their monitoring responsibilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of financial distress. In the same way,
Berberich and Niu (2011) Busier supervisory directors on the board increase the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme.
Bank specific risks and bailouts
The financial crisis has led to a further growing awareness and need for appropriate risk analysis in its different components. In quantitative risk management, the focus lies on how to enhance the measurement and management of specific risks such as liquidity risk, credit risk and market risk (Aebi et al., 2012) . Bank soundness can be affected by different sources of risk, such as credit risk and liquidity risk (Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011 ) and so we examine whether, and how, various bank specific risks affect the likelihood of being bailed out. If there is a relationship, then regular monitoring of risk and early detection of related potential problems may help to prevent/mitigate government assistance. In order to capture bank specific risks, (i.e. credit risk, liquidity risk and growth risk of the equity markets), indicators from the balance sheets of banks and from the market are used.
For Davis and Karim (2008) a symptom of banking crises is increased credit risk or the probability that a borrower will default, converting an asset into a "bad" or non-
performing loan (NPL). "Although banks enjoy advantages in screening and monitoring borrowers, both of which reduce credit risk, the high levels of NPLs associated with crises indicate risk assessment by banks deteriorates during pre-crisis periods" (Davis and
Karim, 2008, p. 93). Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2012) find that a higher proportion of NPLs increases the probability of observed distressed Shareholder Value Ratio. Similarly, Mayes and Stremmel (2012) show that NPLs positively influence the likelihood of bank distress. Also, Dam and Koetter (2012) show that credit risk is associated with a higher expected bailout probability. Thus, the seventh hypothesis and the first related to bank specific risks (H7.1) is the stated as follows: H7.1: Credit risk increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme.
Banks need liquidity to meet deposit withdrawals and satisfy customer loan demand. Liquidity risk at banks can be defined as the likelihood that the demand for cash by bank customers exceeds the bank's ready supply of cash (DeYoung and Jang, 2015) .
Liquidity risk arises from the inability of a bank to accommodate decreases in liabilities or to fund increases in assets (Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2012 Mayes and Stremmel (2012) , using as measure of liquidity the loan-to-deposit ratio find that the lack of liquidity influences positively the likelihood of bank distress. Additionally, to control for liquidity risk Dam and Koetter (2012) use the sum of cash and overnight interbank assets to total assets and conclude that liquidity is not significant in explaining the probability of bank bailouts during 1995-2006.
In the context of the financial crisis and in accordance with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BCBS (2008), which emphasises the importance of liquidity to the functioning of financial markets and the banking sector, as well as the need for adequate risk management, the seventh hypothesis and the second related to bank specific risks (H7.2) is stated as follows: H7.2: Liquidity risk increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme.
Finally, we analyse the growth risk measured by market-to-book ratio. Since book value does not include future growth potential but market value does, the ratio of the market value to the book value is expected to be higher for a firm that is perceived to have many growth opportunities (Ramezani et al., 2002) . Therefore, the deviation of market value from book value depends on the expected growth opportunities and so, it reflects investor expectations regarding the future growth of the firm. Market-to-book ratio is considered a good proxy for the presence of profitable growth options (Ramezani et al., 2002) , measuring the market's perception of the firm (Rose and Thomsen, 2004) .
Therefore, it may also be used as a proxy for growth risk. Higher market-to-book ratios may signal aggressive and riskier strategies to support a higher market evaluation of the growth opportunities materialized, for example, in the loosening of lending and other banking activity standards. In other words, as more growth opportunities are available, banks have stronger incentives to pursue riskier strategies in order to exploit those opportunities to compete. In fact, the top management of high-growth firms would need to make strategic and riskier decisions to stay competitive (Bathala and Rao, 1995) . Since the market-to-book ratio is a standard measure in the literature to proxy for growth opportunities (Linck et al., 2008) , banks with more growth opportunities have higher market-to-book ratio, which reflect higher risk. Thus, the market to book ratio is used as a measure of growth risk. Accordingly, the seventh hypothesis and the third related to bank specific risks (H7.3) is stated as follows: H7.3: Growth risk increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme.
Bank size and bailouts
Large banks have received generous sums of government money and other support measures in order to keep them afloat, given their looming insolvency. "The argument for such policy intervention is that some banks are of a size (and with so important interconnections with other banks) that gives them system-wide relevance" (Rötheli, 2010, p. 123) . The failure of a large financial institution will have ramifications for other financial institutions and therefore the risk to the economy would be enormous (Helwege, 2010) . For Panageas (2010) governments sponsored bailouts given that some of the financial institutions were considered "too-big-to-fail". On the one hand, public bailouts become necessary because the collapse of large banks can impose substantial costs on the real economy. On the other hand, government support of "too-big-to-fail" financial institutions during the crisis provided incontestable proof that these institutions benefit from large explicit and implicit public subsidies, including the expectation that they will receive similar public support during future emergencies (Wilmarth Jr., 2011) . In this way, public bailouts can create moral hazard problems. Banks have an incentive to grow to a size that, in case of misfortune, ensures that they are saved (Stern and Feldman, 2004) . Fernandes and Fich (2013) find that the probability of a bank being bailed out increases as its size increases. This result is in accordance with the commonly held view that many banks were bailed out because they were deemed "too-big-to-fail" by regulators. Large banks are likely to play a greater role in a country´s economic performance and thus may be more likely to receive bailouts. Thus, the eighth hypothesis (H8) is formulated as follows: H8: Bank size increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme.
Bank capital and bailouts
Public requirement for more bank capital tends to be greater after financial crises and reform proposals usually focus on how capital regulation should adapt to prevent future crises (Berger and Bouwman, 2013) .
In the Basel framework bank capital is a main variable for ensuring healthy banks.
Also, many theories suggest that capital improves a bank's survival probability. On the one hand, bank capital serves as a cushion to absorb losses and shocks (Rahman et al., 2004; Repullo, 2004; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011) . A higher level of capital acts as a buffer against financial losses, protecting a bank's solvency, and is expected to decrease the probability of a bank failure (Rahman et al., 2004; Betz et al., 2014) . On the other hand, bank capital has a direct positive effect on monitoring incentive, as well as reducing the probability of default (Mehran and Thakor, 2011) . Additionally, a stronger capital base attenuates the excessive risk-taking incentives.
Cole and White (2012) use proxies for the CAMELS indicators 5 to explain banking failures in the recent financial crisis and they find that capital is one of the factors that explains bank failures during 2009. Berger et al. (2012) analyse the role of corporate governance on US commercial bank failures during the financial crisis and also find that larger amounts of capital decrease the probability of default. Finally, Berger and Bouwman (2013) show that having more capital increases the probability of survival of small banks at all times and of medium and large banks during banking a crisis. According with the arguments presented above, the ninth hypothesis (H9) is formulated as follows:
H9: Bank capital level decreases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme.
Data and methodology

Sample and data sources
The 72 banks in our sample corresponds to those that actually meet the cumulative selection criteria of (i) and not delisted during the crisis period, (ii) with common shares traded on a regulated market and that are not a subsidiary of a bank already included in the sample so as to prevent duplication of data, and (iii) that are covered by BoardEx, our data source on board information. Given the existence of a number of missing observations in some of the variables and the fact that the omitted variables are different between banks, this led to the usage of a smaller number of observations which can further vary according to each model specification.
In our analysis we are interested in troubled banks receiving different types of State assistance (recapitalisation, guarantees or other aid) from their national government so as to avoid failure or dissolution. To identify such banks we use various sources of information.
Our first source is the European Commission website, in which we run detailed searches on the individual banks. We combine this source with two other sources: the annual reports and other documents available on the bank's official website. Additionally, we conduct keyword Google searches using a combination of: (1) the name of each bank in our sample, (2) the terms "bailout", "bailed out", "rescue", "capital injection", "recapitalisation", "guarantee" or "aid" and (3) the words "government" or "State." Based on all these searches, we create a bank bailout dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one reference to "bailout" for the particular bank during the interval 2007-2009. 6 We are interested in whether a specific bank is bailout out, not in the total number of 
Variables description
Bailout variable
A dichotomous qualitative dependent variable is used in this study, which we call Bank bailout. Bank bailout is a binary variable taking the value of one for a bailed-out bank and zero otherwise. 
Board characteristics variables
Risk variables
We include a set of variables in order to capture various aspects of a bank's vulnerability: Credit risk (or default risk), Liquidity risk and Growth risk. Information from the balance sheets of banks as well as the market is used to measure bank specific risks.
Following the literature, we account for credit risk, which is directly linked to asset composition (or asset quality as defined in the CAMELS framework) (Simpson and Gleason, 1999; Rahman et al., 2004; Männasoo and Mayes, 2009; Berger et al., 2012; Dam and Koetter, 2012) . According to Rahman et al. (2004) and Dam and Koetter (2012) ,
Credit risk is measured using the non-performing loan ratio, calculated as non-performing loans to total loans. A high ratio indicates a high probability of a bank being bailed out.
Liquidity risk reflects the probability that banks will be unable to satisfy the claims of depositors. Similarly to Mayes and Stremmel (2012) , as proxy for Liquidity risk we use the loan-to-deposit ratio, this is, total loans divided by total deposits. A high ratio may indicate the lack of liquidity and possible repayment problems for sudden unforeseen obligations. We expect a positive sign for the Liquidity risk variable.
Growth risk is measured by the market-to-book ratio, that is, the ratio of the market value to the equity book value. A higher ratio indicates a more favourable market perception and, thus, assessment of the growth options. Therefore, the likelihood of a bank being bailed out is lower.
In a robustness check, we use alternative risk measures.
Other specific variables of banks: size and capital
Large-scale collapses can impose substantial costs on the real economy, making a public bailout inevitable. Thus, large banks may be more likely to receive government support when confronted with financial distress. To capture the size of the bank, Bank size variable, we use the natural logarithm of market capitalization and alternatively, in a robustness check, we use the natural logarithm of total assets.
Additionally, following several papers, we measure bank capital, Capital variable, by the ratio of total equity to total assets. We expect that a higher ratio makes the bank more resilient to shocks (such a sudden decline in the value of bank assets), other things being equal. Although the risk-weighted capital ratios measures are used in some previous studies "they are open to manipulation and provide space for discretion to cover up the real condition of the bank" (Mayes and Stremmel, 2012, p. 12 (Grossman and Woll, 2014) . Economic theory provides conflicting predictions about the relationship between the concentration and the competitiveness of the banking industry and banking system fragility (Beck et al., 2006) . Some theoretical arguments support the "concentration-stability" view that banking system concentration reduces fragility (Allen and Gale, 2000) . Concentration enhances market power and increases profits. Higher profits provide a "buffer" against adverse shocks, decreasing the probability of bank distress. In contrast, alternative arguments support the "concentration-fragility" view that a more concentrated banking structure raises bank fragility and so, bank distress (Boyd and Nicoló, 2005) . Caminal and Matutes (2002) show that less competition can lead to less credit rationing, larger loans and a higher probability of failure if loans are subject to multiplicative uncertainty. In the same way, Poghosyan and Čihak (2011) show that banks operating in more concentrated banking sectors are more likely to experience bank distress relative to banks operating in less concentrated markets, using as measure of concentration the Herfindahl Index. Advocates of the "concentration-fragility" view also argue that policymakers are more concerned about bank failures when there are only a few banks. Concentration may reduce competition, increase the market power and political influence of financial conglomerates and cause instability of the financial system as banks use their influence to shape banking regulations and policies. Our Concentration variable is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the five largest banks in each country.
Second, another relevant country-level banking sector variable relates to the degree of international integration. To control for this we include as variable the ratio of consolidated foreign claims to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the banks that are reporting to Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (Čihák et al., 2012 ), which we call IIBIS. We can, then, evaluate whether bailed out banks were from countries where the banking system was more exposed to the international environment. Additionally, in order to control for international exposure, and as alternative to the variable IIBIS, we also include the foreign presence in domestic banking markets as an additional control Banks have expanded internationally, namely, by establishing foreign subsidiaries and branches. The global financial crisis has highlighted that there can be risks associated with cross-border banking and foreign bank presence (Claessens and van Horen, 2011) .
In fact, since the onset of the global financial crisis, several papers have pointed out the risks of foreign banking for financial stability (Claessens and van Horen, 2011) .
Increasingly foreign bank presence may work as a channel of international shocks transmission, increasing the vulnerability of domestic banking markets to the international environment. As a measure of foreign bank presence, we consider the importance of foreign banks in terms of numbers and not in terms of assets. On the one hand, data on banking assets that are held by foreign banks is not available for all the countries of our sample, whereas, on the other hand, the number of foreign entrants matters rather than their market share (Claessens et al., 2001) . So, our measure of the degree of foreign participation in domestic banking markets, Foreign, which is a proxy of the level of international exposure/integration to foreign banks, is the ratio of the number of foreign owned banks to the number of the total banks in an economy. A foreign bank is defined as having at least 50% of its shares owned by foreigners.
Third, as a macroeconomic environment control variable, similarly to Faccio et al.
(2006), we include GDP per capita to control for differences in the level of economic development across countries. More specifically, our variable GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. Alternativelly, in a robustness check we use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity.
Supervisory and regulatory environment indicators
Additionally, to control for supervisory and regulatory environment we include two which, during a crisis, can serve as a contagion channel. One source of instability in financial systems is the possibility of contagion, in which a small shock that initially affects one region or sector or even a few institutions, spreads from bank to bank throughout the rest of the system, and then affects the entire economy (Allen and Gale, 2003) , as well as other economies (Eichengreen et al., 2012) .
Corruption indicator
Finally, in order to control for differences in perceived corruption across countries, we include the variable freedom from corruption, called Freedom corruption. Higher values denote lower levels of corruption. Corruption deteriorates freedom by introducing insecurity and uncertainty into economic relationships and is a failure of integrity in the economic system. Freedom from corruption is expected to promote equitable treatment and greater regulatory efficiency.
There is an overlap between some of the control variables, which are used for robustness purposes. Thus, we note these overlaps and we do not include them simultaneously in the regressions.
The definitions of all the variables are detailed in Appendix 1.
Empirical framework
In the proposed empirical model the dependent variable is binary (bailed out or not bailed out). Therefore, we estimate cross-sectional probit model regressions to determine the likelihood of bank bailouts.
More specifically, in our model the dependent variable is a bailout indicator variable equal to one for banks that are bailed out at any time over the interval [2007, 2009] (2) 
We examine the heteroscedasticity using the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and heteroscedasticity was not confirmed in our model. 9 Also, we estimate the model with robust variances-covariances. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in our analysis. 9 We carry out the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for heteroscedasticity using the artificial regression method described in detail by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) . We test the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity against the alternative of heteroscedasticity of the form:
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
, where is an unknown parameter. 10 So, the standard errors are robust to certain misspecification of the underlying distribution of the binary dependent variable. Furthermore, in our sample, the official supervisory index ranges from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 14, which is also the highest value of the index, and the mean is 9.306. Financial freedom ranges from a minimum of 50 to a maximum of 90, where the highest value of the index is 100, and a mean is 65. Finally, freedom from corruption ranges from a minimum of 43 to a maximum of 97, where the highest value of the index is 100, and the mean is 73.139.
To obtain a first impression on potential differences between bailed out and not bailed out banks we compare our main variables, underlying to our hypotheses, between these two groups of banks. Descriptive statistics and the univariate tests of differences between bailed out and not bailed out banks are reported in Table 2 . The univariate tests 12 In the Basel III framework, 1) Common Equity Tier 1 must be at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets at all times, 2) Tier 1 Capital must be at least 6.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times, 3) Total Capital (Tier 1 Capital plus Tier 2 Capital) must be at least 8.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times and 4) a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2017. 13 Although we use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in the regression analysis, ln(GDP per capita), in Table 1 Asterisks indicate significance at the1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. a) t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for the continuous variables and the Chi-squared test for the categorical variable (CEO duality). Comparing the results for bailed out and not bailed out banks, and according to the mean difference test (t-test), we find that bailed out banks have a larger board, higher credit risk, larger size and less capital. The results remain unchanged, with the exception of credit risk, according to the median difference tests (Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test and Chi-squared test). Since in a univariate setting we do not control for various factors that may influence the likelihood of a bank being bailed out, we will forego a detailed analysis of the univariate statistics and instead rely on the multivariate regression results to interpret the influence of the variables on bank bailouts in greater detail. Table 3 
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Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable.
Multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in our model. The correlation coefficients among all independent variables included in each regression analysis are less, in absolute value, than 0.8, 14 that is the threshold beyond which multicollinearity problems arise (e.g., Gujarati, 2004) . In addition, to double check for any multicollinearity issue we also compute the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent variable. All the VIF values (unreported but available upon request) are below the critical value of 10 (e.g., Gujarati, 2004; Asteriou and Hall, 2011) , which indicate that multicollinearity is not a major problem in the regression analyses. We note that, since multicollinearity is mainly an issue involving independent variables in a regression rather than the dependent variable or the link function between the independent and the dependent variables, the use of available linear regression methods is usually applicable in nonlinear regression settings. As Menard (2002, p. 76) points up "because the concern is with the relationship among the independent variables, the functional form of the model for the dependent variable is irrelevant to the estimation of collinearity."
Estimation results on the determinants of bailouts
In this sub-section we present and analyse the results of the probit regressions which test the relationship between the dependent variable Bank bailouts and a set of corporate governance variables, bank specific risks, bank capital, bank size and control variables.
Our goal is to analyse the determinants of the likelihood of bailouts in the European banking sector in the context of the global financial crisis. (2) to (4) we test the robustness of our findings. 
The baseline model
The baseline estimation results, Column (1) in Table 4 , show that the coefficient on the Board independence variable is positive and statistically significant and thus, board independence positively influence the likelihood of a bailout. This confirms hypothesis H1 and is consistent with previous studies in the context of the financial crisis (Adams, 2012) and related to corporate failure (Hsu and Wu, 2014) . Our result suggests that independent directors suffer from bank-specific knowledge, which penalises the effectiveness of the board and thus, increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme. The coefficient on the Board size variable, on the contrary, is not statistically significant, indicating no association between the board size and the probability of bailouts of our sample banks. This finding is consistent with Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) , Lajili and Zéghal (2010) and Darrat et al. (2014) respectively on financial distress and bankrupt firms, but contradicts Adams (2012) who finds that banks that received funds from TARP in the US have larger board. In a sample of European banks we do not find evidence that larger boards of banks are detrimental and, thereby, increase the probability of participating in a bailout programme. Our hypothesis H2 is not confirmed. The lack of statistical significance regarding the CEO duality variable indicates that separating the positions of CEO and Chairman has no impact on the likelihood of a bank being bailed out. Therefore, we do not find support for the hypothesis H3. This finding is consistent with previous financial distress studies (Elloumi and Gueyié, 2001; Abdullah, 2006; Miglani et al., 2015) , bankruptcy studies (Lajili and Zéghal, 2010) and the study by Carty and Weiss (2012) which, using a sample of US publicly traded banks, shows that banks with a dual CEO structure are not more likely to participate in bailout programmes. Thus, results in the European context are in accordance with results in the US context. On the contrary, Column (1) in Table 4 reveals that banking experience matters and so, we find support for hypothesis H4. The coefficient on the Board experience variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that banking experience providing a deep and sound knowledge of the complexity, dynamics and specificities of the banking activity, as well as a better comprehension of its opaqueness and regulatory environment, make it less likely for a bank to be bailed out as found by Fernandes and Fich (2013) . Thus, banking experience of the board's supervisory directors enables banks to be safer from government assistance. Similarly, the coefficient on the Director tenure variable is negative and statistically significant, confirming hypothesis H5. As expected, banks with shorter supervisory directors' tenure are more likely to need State aid. Thus, a bank is better served by longer-standing supervisory directors', who have more bank specific knowledge and are better able to monitor and advise bank managers. This finding is also found, for example, by Lajili and Zéghal (2010) . The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the Board busyness variable indicates that busier supervisory directors increase the probability of a bank participating in a bailout programme, confirming hypothesis H6. This result provides support for the Busyness Hypothesis and the view that the presence of supervisory directors holding too many directorships compromises board effectiveness.
With respect to bank specific risks, the coefficients on the Credit risk and Liquidity risk variables are positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient on the Growth risk variable is not statistically significant. Thus, the credit and liquidity risks increase the likelihood of a bank being bailed out while the growth risk has no impact. These results confirm hypotheses H7.1 and H7.2 but not hypothesis H7.3. Consistent with the general view, (e.g., Dam and Koetter, 2012) , the decline in the quality of banks' loan portfolios, resulting in an increasing proportion of non-performing loans, is associated with a higher probability of being bailed out. The larger the proportion of non-performing loans, the more likely a bank will participate in a bailout plan. Also, as expected, we find a positive sign for the liquidity risk measure in predicting bailouts. So, as the loan-to-deposit ratio increases the likelihood of a bank being bailed out increases. This finding is in accordance with the existence of benefits associated with liquidity.
Furthermore, in our sample of cross-country European banks the coefficient on the Bank size variable is not statistically significant, which does not confirm hypothesis H8. So, our findings do not support the view that individual bank size creates a moral hazard problem resulting from the fact that, as banks grow they increase their importance and so the probability of being saved. The issue of "too-big-to-fail" is not validated at bank-level but is validated at country-level given that the coefficient on the Concentration variable is positive and statistically significant. Concentration variable is used as proxy for the importance of the banking sector and its potential influence on banking regulations and policies. Size of individual banks does not seem to matter, but size (and importance) of the banking sector in a country increases the probability of receiving bailouts from government. In contrast to our expectation, the coefficient on the Capital variable is not statistically significant. Thus, the capital of banks, in our sample, has no impact on the likelihood of bailouts and hypothesis H9 is not confirmed.
Concerning bank-level control variables, the coefficient on the 2006 performance variable is positive and statistically significant and the coefficient on the CG committee variable is negative and statistically significant. Our results show that performance before the crisis increases the likelihood of bailouts. So, the better-performing banks before the crisis are the most likely to be bailed out following the crisis. Also, banks with a corporate governance committee are less likely to participate in a bailout programme. On the contrary, the coefficient on the Institutional ownership variable is not is not statistically significant and thus, institutional investors do not influence the likelihood of bailouts.
Moreover, we find that country-level variables explain the probability of individual banks being bailed out. The coefficients on Concentration and IIBIS variables are both positive and statistically significant. In line with the "concentration-fragility" view, (e.g., De Nicoló et al., 2004; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011) , we find that banks located in more concentrated banking sectors are more likely to be bailed out. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence suggesting the importance of the degree of international integration.
Increasing the international exposure of a country's banking system increases the probability of a bank of that country participating in a bailout programme. Finally, the coefficient on the GDP per capita is negative and significant, indicating that banks are more likely to be bailed out in poorer countries.
Robustness checks
To assess the reliability of the baseline results, we employ a set of robustness checks, Table 4 , Columns (2)-(4).
While we do not formally hypothesize interactive effects, we now extend our research by explicitly modelling a corporate governance interaction term. The underlying idea is that, in addition to the effect of various governance variables (taken individually) on the likelihood of bailouts, the interaction effect among these variables can help to predict bailouts. Encouraged by previous studies in the context of corporate bankruptcy Dalton, 1994a, 1994b) we test the interaction between board independence and CEO duality. This interaction variable is the unweighted multiplication of a bank's proportion of independent directors and dual CEO corporate governance structure.
Column (2) presents the results when the interaction term among the corporate governance variables is included. Interestingly, although board independence and CEO duality (taken individually) have a positive impact on the likelihood of bailouts, the twoway interaction between board independence and CEO duality has a negative impact. Our findings do not confirm those of Dalton (1994a, 1994b) , who find a positive relationship in the context of bankrupt firms. The introduction of the interaction term leaves the results unchanged, with the exception of CEO duality that gains statistical significance.
In column (3) we replace the IIBIS variable in the baseline model with the Foreign variable, which is the fraction of the number of foreign owned banks to the number of the total banks in the country. As result of increasing financial integration, foreign banks have become important in domestic financial intermediation (Claessens and van Horen, 2011) .
As there is a potential overlap between both variables we do not include them simultaneously in the regressions below. Similarly to the coefficient on the IIBIS variable, the coefficient on the Foreign variable is significantly positive. Additionally, our qualitative findings with respect to the main explanatory variables remain unchanged and with regard to the control variables the differences are negligible, supporting the robustness of our results.
In Column (4) we investigate the sensitivity of the results of our baseline model using a different definition of specific risks, bank size, capital, concentration and level of economic development. Specifically, we measure: 1) credit risk as the ratio of nonperforming assets to total assets, 2) liquidity risk as the ratio of total deposits to total assets, 3) growth risk as the percentage of assets growth in the year immediately prior to the financial crisis, 4) bank size as the natural logarithm of total assets, 5) capital as the capital adequacy ratio Tier 1, which represents the ratio of Tier 1 Capital to total riskweighted assets, 6) concentration in the banking industry as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country and 7) level of economic development as the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, based on purchasing power parity. Estimation results are very similar to the baseline model thus, suggesting that our results are scarcely affected by the use of alternative variables. We note that only the coefficient on the Board independence variable loses statistical significance, but the coefficient on the CEO duality variable is now statistically significant.
Additionally, in unreported regression we replicate the estimation in Columns (2) and (4) using Foreign variable instead of the IIBIS variable and we arrive at similar conclusions.
Introducing additional control variables
As a new step we augmented the baseline model by introducing additional banklevel and country-level control variables. First, we want to confirm that our main conclusions hold when additional control variables are accounted for. Second, we intend to test whether the existence of a board audit committee, the supervision and the regulation in the banking sector affect the likelihood of a bank being bailed out.
Controlling for differences in national policies provides not only a simple robustness test but it is also independently valuable as countries implement regulations to promote stability. Table 5 presents the results.
Table 5 -Determinants of bailouts with additional control variables
The table presents the results of the probit regressions used to predict the probability of bailouts in the European banking sector in the context of the financial crisis, including additional control variables.
Variable
(1) In Table 5 , Column (1), to account for the impact of the existence of a separate audit committee, we also include the Audit committee variable, which is a dummy variable with a value of one if the bank has an audit committee and zero otherwise. We conclude that, similarly to Miglani et al. (2015) , the coefficient on the Audit committee variable is negative and statistically significant. The existence of an audit committee, as well as the existence of a corporate governance committee, decreases the likelihood of bailouts. This finding is consistent with the argument of Forker (1992) that the presence of an audit committee enhances board monitoring quality and attenuates agency costs. We note that the coefficient on the Capital variable is, now, negative and statistically significant.
Next we account for differences in bank supervision and regulation. In Column (2), we add to our baseline model the official supervisory powers index, Official index variable, which is an index of the power of the country's commercial bank supervisory agency. We find that the coefficient on the Official index variable is not statistically significant and that our results are robust to the introduction of this additional control variable.
Further, alternatively, in Column (3), we include the variable Financial freedom, which is an indicator of the general openness and regulatory framework as it contains elements like openness to foreign competition and the extent of government regulation of financial services. Also, we note the potential overlap between the IIBIS and the Financial freedom variables, yet we do not include them at the same time. The results are not very different from the baseline model. Regarding our main variables, the coefficients on the Board independence and Liquidity risk variables are now not statistically significant. Also, we find that the coefficient on the Financial freedom variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that fewer restrictions on banking freedom and greater openness increase the likelihood of bailouts. Thus, our results suggest detrimental effects of financial freedom. Banks are able to operate more freely and to engage in different and risky activities, far beyond their core activities. Also, the data points to the presence of contagion effects.
Lastly, in Column (4), we check the extent to which our results might be driven by corruption differences in countries. The estimation results corroborate our findings for the baseline specification. Also, the coefficient on the Freedom corruption variable is not significant at the conventional levels. Thus, as Faccio et al. (2006) , the level of corruption is not statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of a bailout.
Conclusion
Governments intervened massively and repeatedly to support banks during the financial crisis in order to ensure their survival. Due to the uniqueness of banks and their impact on the stability of the financial system, several rescue programmes were adopted.
Given the tremendous and costly bailout packages worldwide, the analysis of the determinants of the likelihood of banks being bailed out is of the utmost importance, namely in the process of reforming the financial regulation, the weaknesses of which were revealed by the global financial crisis. The results of our study therefore have relevant public policy implications. Overall, our results show that a set of characteristics of the board, bank risks and control variables have predictive power in explaining the probability of bailouts. Specifically, banks with more experienced boards, longer tenure and less busy supervisory directors are less likely to be bailed out. So, strong emphasis should be placed on the analysis of the board of a bank. On the other hand, both credit risk and liquidity risk, as well as the country-specific banking sector factors, concentration and international exposure, increase the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme. These qualitative findings are unchanged in all regressions. Also, in the baseline model, board independence, performance prior to the financial crisis, the existence of a corporate governance committee and the level of economic development, measured by GDP per capita, have predictive power.
Additionally, we first examine the impact of the existence of an audit committee and, second, the impact of the supervisory and regulatory environment variables. We find that the existence of an audit committee and the index of financial freedom are, respectively, negatively and positively associated with the likelihood of bailouts. These findings are consistent with the idea that the presence of an audit committee strengthens board monitoring and reduces agency costs and that greater freedom, acting as a contagion channel of shocks, has a detrimental effect.
